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ANTITRUST - PARENT CORPORATION AND ITS WHOLLY 
OWNED SUBSIDIARY ARE INCAPABLE OF CONSPIRING 
WITH EACH OTHER UNDER SECTION ONE OF THE SHER-
MAN ACT. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 
2731 (1984). 
Copperweld, a parent corporation, sent letters to various businesses 
urging them not to deal with Independence Tube, a competitor of Cop-
perweld's wholly owned subsidiary, Regal Tube.! Independence sued 
Copperweld and Regal in federal district court alleging that the two com-
panies conspired in restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act (Act).2 The jury returned a verdict against the defendants, and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,3 
finding that Copperweld and Regal were sufficiently distinct entities, that 
were capable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Act.4 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to reevaluate the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine used as the basis for holding the affiliated corporations 
liable as independent entities capable of conspiring in violation of section 
1 of the Sherman Act. 5 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a 
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of con-
spiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act6 because they must 
be treated as one unified entity.7 The Court, therefore, held that a parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are not subject to the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 8 
In 1890, the Sherman Act was passed9 in response to public concern 
over the growth of trusts and monopolies. \0 At that time the trust was a 
device used by corporations in the same line of business to control the 
price and supply of certain goods and to restrict competition.!! The pur-
1. Copperweld corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). Upon re-
ceipt of one of the letters sent by Copperweld, Yoder Co. voided the purchase order 
for a tubing mill which it had agreed to supply to Independence Tube. Indepen-
dence was able to obtain a mill from another company, but the breach by Yoder Co. 
delayed Independence's entry into the steel tubing industry by nine months. /d. at 
2734-35. 
2. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1 (1982). 
3. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 
104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). 
4. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 320 (7th Cir. 1982), 
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). 
5. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2736 (1984). 
6. [d. at 2745. 
7. [d. at 2742. 
8. See id. at 2745. 
9. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.c. §§ 1-7 (1982». 
10. THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITIEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS 6 (1955 & reprint 1981); A. AUSTIN, ANTITRUST: LAWS, ECONOMICS, POL-
ICY § 3.2 (1976); 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.1, at 125 (1980); 
Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 
221, 222 (1956). 
11. See United States v. Northern Securities Co., 120 F. 721, 724 (D. Minn. 1903), affd, 
193 U.S. 197 (1904); E. HODGES, THE ANTITRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 
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pose of the Act was, and is to promote free competition and to prohibit 
unreasonable l2 restraints of trade. \3 Section 1 of the Act provides that 
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade ... is declared to be illegal .... "14 
As evident from its language, section 1 is not intended to proscribe 
the unilateral conduct of a single enterprise. IS An unreasonable restraint 
of trade by a single enterprise is prohibited by other provisions of anti-
trust laws. For example, section 2 of the Sherman Act l6 prohibits mo-
nopolization or attempted monopolization resulting from both the 
concerted conduct of two or more independent entities and the unilateral 
conduct of a single enterprise.n Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act also proscribes anticompetitive conduct by a single enterprise. 18 
2 (1941); I E. KINTNER, supra note 10, at § 4.2, at 131 (quoting President Grover 
Cleveland); I H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 3.1, at 55-56 (1949). By combining their stock to be held in trust 
by a central committee, the corporations were controlled by that committee through 
its members' voting power as trustees. See Article, A Statement of the Trust Prob-
lem, 16 HARV. L. REV. 79, 80-81 (1902); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1352 (5th ed. 
1979). 
The trusts were most prevalent in the consumer goods industries, such as fuel 
oil, sugar, matches, whiskey and cottonseed. See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12 (2d ed. 1970); LETWIN, supra note 
10, at 225. 
12. Section 1 of the Sherman Act has been interpreted to prohibit only those contracts, 
combinations, or conspiracies that "unreasonably" restrain trade. Northern Pacific 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958) (citing Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911) and Board of Trade of Chicago v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918». 
13. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919) (purpose was to "pre-
serve the right of freedom to trade"). 
14. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1 (1982). 
15. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Albrecht v. 
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Monsanto was decided three months before 
Copperweld. 
16. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) which provides in pertinent part: 
"Every person who shall monpolize, or attempt to monopolize, ... or conspire 
with any other person ... to monopolize ... shall be deemed guilty .... " Not 
every monopoly is illegal under section 2 of the Sherman Act. For example, monpo-
lies granted by the government under the patent law for a limited time period and 
those that exist as the result of such extensive economies of scale that the industry 
can support only one enterprise, are not illegal under section 2. Mueller, Monopoly 
and the Law: The Case of the 'Prudent'Monopolist, 11 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 73, 
83 n.6 (1979); see also Trixler Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 505 F.2d 1045, 
1051 (9th Cir. 1974) (manufacturer has natural monopoly over its own products, 
especially if sold under trademark); Lamb Enter., Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 
F.2d 506, 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972) (natural monopoly not 
per se violation of antitrust laws). But cf Hamilton & Caulfield, The Defense of 
Natural Monopoly in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 465 
(1984) (urging that a natural monopoly should not be completely immunized from 
section 2 liability). 
17. Section 2 of the Sherman Act reaches conduct ofa single "person who shall monop-
olize" and conduct involving a conspiracy to monopolize. Sherman Antitrust Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). 
18. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.c. § 45 (1982). Section 5(a) of the Federal 
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Because section 1 of the Sherman Act is aimed at unreasonable restraints 
of trade resulting from contracts, combinations such as trusts, or conspir-
acies, a plurality of actors is required to prove a violation of section 1. 19 
This requirement encouraged affiliated corporations charged with a vio-
lation of section 1 to use the defense that they were a single entity incapa-
ble of conspiring under section 1.20 
In order to bring affiliated corporations within the sweep of the sec-
tion 1 plurality requirement, courts developed the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine. This doctrine treats members of the same corporate 
enterprise as separate actors, thus preventing affiliated corporations from 
escaping liability under section 1.21 The Supreme Court first applied the 
doctrine in United States v. Yellow Cab CO.22 In Yellow Cab, the control-
ling shareholder of a taxicab manufacturing company was charged with 
conspiring with the manufacturing company and five other affiliated cor-
porations23 to restrain and monopolize trade in the sale of taxicabs and 
Trade Commission Act provides in pertinent part: "Unfair methods of competition 
... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices ... are declared illegal." 
19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
20. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141 
(1968) (defendants argued they were a single entity); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph 
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951) (defendants argued they were 
"mere instrumentalities" of a single unit); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 
U.S. 218, 227 (1947) (defendants argued they were a "vertically integrated 
enterprise"). 
21. Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 
CARDOZO L. REV. 23, 23 (1981); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
22. 332 U.S. 218 (1947). Although Yellow Cab was the first Supreme Court case to 
make use of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, courts had found affiliated cor-
porations liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act on other grounds prior to Yel-
low Cab. See United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944) 
(defense of conspiratorial incapacity was never raised); United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). The de-
fendants in General Motors argued the "single trader" defense which is premised on 
the idea that, as a single trader, they have a right to condition the sale of their 
product and to restrain their own product by selling it to whomever they choose. 
Rejecting this defense, the court stated, "[n]or can the ... [defendants] enjoy the 
benefits of separate corporate identity and escape the consequences of an illegal 
combination ... " by arguing that they are one "trader." The court cited no au-
thority in support of their statement and, furthermore, held that the defendants 
could be held liable on other grounds. Id. at 404. The other basis for liability of the 
defendants in General Motors was that their activities constituted an illegal vertical 
contractual restraint. See Handler & Smart, supra note 21, at 27. 
23. The exact ownership of the affiliated corporations can be broken down as follows: 
Morris Markin was the controlling shareholder of Checker Cab Manufacturing 
Corporation (CCM) and the sole shareholder of Cab Sales and Parts Corporation 
(Cab Sales). CCM owned 62% of the stock of Parmalee Transportation Company 
(Parmalee) which owned a controlling interest in Chicago Yellow Cab Company, 
Inc. (Chicago Yellow) and owned all of the stock of Deluxe Motor Cab Company. 
Yellow Cab Company (Yellow) was the wholly owned subsidiary of Chicago Yel-
low. Associates of Markin owned 97% of the stock of Checker Taxi Company 
(Checker). Yellow, Chicago Yellow, Parmalee, Cab Sales, Checker, CCM, and 
Markin were the alleged conspirators, and the corporate interrelationships between 
those companies resulted in the exclusion of other taxicab manufacturers from 15% 
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taxicab services in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 24 
The Court held that the common ownership and control of the affiliated 
companies did not immunize the alleged conspiracy from the application 
of the Sherman Act25 when the companies had affiliated for the illegal 
purpose of restraining trade. 26 
In Yellow Cab, the initial acquisitions of the affiliated taxicab com-
panies alone constituted a section 1 violation, because the acquisitions 
resulted from the concerted action of several previously separate entities, 
lessening competition and retraining trade in the taxicab industry.27 Fur-
thermore, the Yellow Cab Court could have found the defendants in vio-
lation of section 2 of the Sherman Act because the corporations' activities 
constituted an attempted monopolization of the taxicab business.28 Un-
fortunately, the Court in Yellow Cab did not expressly restrict its holding 
to the original illegal affiliation or the attempted monopolization, but in-
stead stated that any affiliation among the corporate defendants would 
not relieve them of liability under the Sherman Act.29 This holding has 
been interpreted broadly by lower courts, that have held that whenever 
defendants are separately incorporated, they are capable of conspiring. 30 
The Supreme Court also subsequently applied Yellow Cab to find viola-
tions of section l,31 Although the Court has had the opportunity to clar-
ify Yellow Cab and to analyze the basis for its holding, the Court has 
of the New York City market, 58% of the Minneapolis market, 86% of the Chicago 
market, and 100% of the Pittsburgh market. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 
U.S. 218, 221-24 (1947). 
24. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1 & 2 (1982). A monopoly prohibited under 
the Sherman Act has been defined as "the power to fix prices or exclude competition 
coupled with policies designed to use or preserve that power." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 908 (5th ed. 1979) (quoting United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. 
Supp. 54, 58 (D. Minn. 1971». Section 2 liability is established when the defendant 
possesses monopoly power and has wilfully acquired or maintained that power. See, 
e.g., Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee, 624 F.2d 
798, 813 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, 
Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 100-101 (D. Iowa 1982), affd per curiam, 721 F.2d 253 (8th 
Cir. 1983); Becker v. Egypt News Co., 548 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (D. Mo. 1982), 
aff'd, 713 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1983). 
25. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 227. 
26. Id. at 229. 
27. See Handler & Smart, supra note 21 at 29. 
28. Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 MISS. 
L. J. 5, 12 (1963). 
29. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 227. 
30. E.g., Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 579 F.2d 
20,34 n.29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. 
v. Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 1004 (1975); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th 
Cir. 1969). 
31. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) 
(holding that a parent corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary, and two other sub-
sidiaries had violated section 1); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 
U.S. 593 (1951) (American corporation and two foreign affiliated corporations 
found guilty of a section 1 violation); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & 
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simply reiterated its holding that affiliated corporations are capable of 
conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 32 
The most recent Supreme Court decision to find that affiliated cor-
porations had conspired in violation of section 1 of the Act is Permo Life 
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.33 In Permo Life, a parent cor-
poration, its wholly owned subsidiary, and two partially owned subsidi-
aries were charged with illegally restraining trade by making agreements 
with muffler dealers that restricted the dealers' resale prices, prohibited 
the dealers from trading with the defendants' competitors, tied the sale of 
mufflers to the sale of other products in the defendants' line, and fixed 
sales territories.34 The defendants argued that they were all part of a 
single enterprise incapable of conspiring under section 1.35 Citing Yellow 
Cab, the Court rejected that argument, stating that because the defend-
ants were separately incorporated, any affiliation would not preclude the 
Court from imposing the sanctions of section 1.36 
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (two subsidiaries of a common parent held to have 
conspired in violation of section 1). 
Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) has been 
included by at least one commentator in the discussion of Supreme Court cases that 
have applied the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. See, e.g., Note, (Intraenter-
prise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decisionmaking Approach, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1732, 
1739 n.36 (1983) (including Schine Chain Theaters in a list of Supreme Court cases 
that had applied the doctrine). The defendants in Schine Chain Theaters, however, 
were found guilty of conspiring with unaffiliated distributors under section 1 and 
monopolizing under section 2. Thus, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was 
inapplicable in that case. Handler & Smart, supra note 21, at 27-28 n.22. 
32. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 
(\968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); 
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U:S. 211, 215 (1951). In 
Kiefer-Stewart, two affiliated corporations in the business of selling liquor to whole-
salers were held liable for a section 1 violation. The Court determined that the 
defendant corporations had conspired to sell liquor only to those wholesalers that 
agreed to sell at prices fixed by the two corporations. The two affiliated corpora-
tions contended that they were "mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing 
merchandizing unit," and, therefore, incapable of conspiring. Kiefer-Stewart, 340 
U.S. at 215. In response, the Kiefer-Stewart Court simply reiterated the rule set 
forth in Yellow Cab that affiliation between the corporations would not relieve them 
of liability under the Sherman Act. The Court stressed that the rule of Yellow Cab 
was particularly applicable, where, as in Kiefer-Stewart, the corporate defendants 
held themselves out as competitors of each other. Id. 
In Timken Roller Bearing Co., the Court again applied the doctrine of intra-
enterprise conspiracy. The Court ruled against the defendants - a domestic cor-
poration and its partially owned foreign counterparts - finding that the affiliated 
corporations had fixed prices, allocated trade territories, and engaged in other an-
ticompetitive conduct in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Although the 
Court had the opportunity to explain or clarify the holding of Yellow Cab, the Court 
simply cited Kiefer-Stewart for the Yellow Cab rule that common ownership or con-
trol will not relieve affiliated corporations of the sanctions of the Sherman Act. 
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. at 598. 
33. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
34. Id. at 136-37. 
35. Id. at 141. 
36. Id. at 141-42. The Court stated that because the parent corporation (International) 
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The absence of Supreme Court analysis of the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine led the various circuits to devise their own tests to deal 
with the issue of the conspiratorial capacity of affiliated corporations 
under section 1. One approach was the "all the facts and circumstances" 
test, which required consideration of factors such as the past relationship 
between the corporations, and whether the corporations had separate 
managerial staff, records and bank accounts, and corporate offices and 
officers.37 For example, if the firms had never operated as separate enti-
ties before becoming affiliated, and the businesses had common staff, 
bank accounts and offices, it would indicate that the corporations were 
one entity incapable of a section 1 conspiracy. A second test focused on 
whether the affiliated corporations' intent was to have a detrimental eco-
nomic effect on third parties or whether the corporations' conduct re-
flected a purely internal decision.38 According to this test, a decision 
related to internal matters of the enterprise would not be scrutinized 
under section 1. Application of a third test resulted in a finding of con-
spiratorial capacity if the corporations held themselves out as competi-
tors of one another.39 A fourth approach, the "sole decision maker" test, 
was premised on the theory that if one person controlled and made the 
decisions for several affiliated corporations, the corporations were inca-
pable of conspiring because they lacked the requisite plurality of actors.40 
and its wholly owned subsidiary (Midas) "availed themselves of the privilege of 
doing business through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could 
not save them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate entities." 
/d. Thus the percentage of the subsidiary owned by the parent was irrelevant. A 
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary would be capable of conspiring 
under the Perma Life interpretation. 
37. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(overlapping management, consolidated financial statements, same corporate of-
fices), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 
795,802 (9th Cir. 1976) (newspapers had same sports, financial, and editorial pages, 
same presidents and management, and common officers), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 
(1977); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Tugboat Co., 467 F. 
Supp. 841, 849 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (separate managements. locations, equipment, and 
solicitation of business), affd on other grounds, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982). 
38. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Western Electric Co., 512 F. Supp. 128, 131-33 (N.D. Cal. 
1981) (agreement concerning manpower is matter of internal management), affd, 
680 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); REA Express, Inc. 
v. Alabama Great S. R.R. Co., 427 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (agreement 
affected no one other than parent and subsidiary), affd memo sub nom., Somerwine 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 961 (1977). Cf Chastain v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 401 F. Supp. 151, 160 (D.D.C. 1975) (if defendants have anticompetitive 
intent and effect is similar to conspiracy, then corporate affiliation no defense). 
39. See, e.g., J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 704 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 
1983) (subsidiaries neither competed nor held themselves out as competitors); 
Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039, 1043-45 (E.D. 
Mich. 1976) (parent and subsidiary never acted as competitors); Call Carl, Inc. v. 
BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 572-73 (D. Md. 1975) (parent and subsidiary were 
not in competition in the market), affd in part, rev'd in part, 554 F.2d 623 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977). 
40. See, e.g., Harvey V. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 455-58 (9th Cir. 
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A fifth test involved the simple inquiry into whether the defendants were 
separately incorporated and thus capable of conspiring in violation of 
section 1. 41 
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.42 the Court ex-
amined the rationale for the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and 
abolished the former standards for determining the conspiratorial capac-
ity of a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.43 In Cop-
perweld, the Court held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiary are incapable of conspiring under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, and thus abolished the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine with re-
spect to parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries.44 
The Court analogized the status of a wholly owned subsidiary vis-a-
vis its parent corporation to that of an officer of a corporation and to an 
unincorporated division.45 The officer, unincorporated division, and the 
wholly owned subsidiary are all incapable of conspiring with the parent 
corporation because they strive to benefit the parent corporation.46 This 
unity of interest with the parent corporation was the basis for the Court's 
holding that the two corporations were incapable of conspiring under 
section 1.47 The Court repUdiated the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine with respect to parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidi-
aries because the doctrine focuses on the legal form of an enterprise, that 
is, whether the enterprise is separately incorporated, rather than on the 
substantive realities of how the business is operated.48 There may be no 
difference between the way the affiliated corporations are managed and 
the wayan unincorporated division and its parent operate. Yet, under 
1979) (no conspiracy when sole shareholder alone made allegedly anticompetitive 
decision); Maryland ex rei. Sachs v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distrib., 560 F. Supp. 760, 
767 n.12 (D. Md. 1983) ("one man show" exception exists to the intra-enterprise 
conspiracy doctrine) (dictum); Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 
94 F. Supp. 388, 396 (D. Md. 1950) (where one person directed and caused activi-
ties, no conspiracy found), affd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951). 
41. See, e.g., H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244-45 
(5th Cir. 1978) (separate incorporation made subsidiary a distinct entity); Columbia 
Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 33 (3d Cir.) 
(parent and subsidiary capable of conspiring because separately incorporated enti-
ties), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock 
Pool Bldrs., Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974) (applied doctrine recognizing 
"thin" conspiracies among corporations), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). 
42. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). 
43. Id. at 2736. 
44. Id. at 2745. The Court did not consider whether a parent corporation is capable of 
conspiring with a subsidiary that it does not wholly own. Id. at 2740. 
45. !d. at 2741-42. 
46. See id. at 2741-42; Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (holding that officers are incapable 
of conspiring with corporation); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & 
Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71,83-84 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) 
(holding that unincorporated divisions are incapable of conspiring with 
corporation). 
47. Id. at 2742. 
48. See id. at 2743-44. 
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the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the affiliated corporations are 
capable of conspiring when unincorporated divisions are not.49 The 
Court therefore established a per se test, eliminating the need for the 
various tests previously applied by the circuits. 50 
The Court emphasized the distinction between section 1 and section 
2 of the Sherman Act to demonstrate that conduct of a single entity is 
not intended to be proscribed by section LSI If, however, a single firm's 
anticompetitive conduct does not rise to the level of a section 2 monopo-
lization, the firm will escape the reach of the Sherman Act because the 
firm lacks the plurality of actors required for liability under section 1. 
Thus, a gap is created in the scope of the Sherman Act. The majority 
stressed that Congress left this gap open to effectuate the procompetitive 
purpose of the Act. SUbjecting the entrepreneurial efforts of an enthusi-
astic competitor to the scrutiny of section 1 would discourage the zealous 
competition that the Sherman Act seeks to promote. 52 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that interpreting section 1 as 
prohibiting the unilateral conduct of one enterprise would make the 
"contract, combination, or conspiracy" language of the Act superfluous, 
because conduct by a single entity does not constitute a joining of two 
previously independent enterprises, a factor which is essential to a con-
tract or conspiracy. 53 Although recognizing the gap in the coverage of 
sections 1 and 2, the majority pointed out that the activities of a parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary may be adequately scruti-
nized under other antitrust laws, without the need to apply the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 54 
49. See id. at 2741-43. 
50. The Court rejected the "all the facts and circumstances" test which was applied by 
the lower court in Copperweld, stating that those factors tending to show the sepa-
rateness of the subsidiary are not sufficient to "overcome the basic fact that the 
ultimate interests of the subsidiary and the parent are identical." Id. at 2742 n.18. 
51. Id. at 2740-41; see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
52. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2744. For example, nothing in the Sherman Act prohibits 
one competitor from acquiring another's customers through the development of a 
superior product or service. Id. at 2740 n.14. 
53. Id. at 2744. 
54. Id. at 2745. For example, the initial acquisition of a subsidiary by a parent corpora-
tion is subject to the scrutiny of sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act if the acquisi-
tion constituted either an unreasonable restraint of trade resulting from concerted 
conduct or an attempted or actual monopolization. Furthermore, the initial acquisi-
tion would be scrutinized under section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits the 
acquisition of the stock of one corporation by another corporation where the effect 
of such acquisition would be to substantially decrease competition or to create a 
monopoly. Clayton Act, 15 V.S.c. § 18 (1982). Post-acquisition conduct of the par-
ent and its wholly owned subsidiary would remain subject to section 2 of the Sher-
man Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which both proscribe 
anticompetitive conduct, including that of a single enterprise. Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 15 V.S.c. § 45 (1982). For a discussion of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, see supra notes 16-17, 24 and accompanying text. For a discussion of section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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A three-judge dissent55 argued that the majority's holding was un-
sound and overly broad because the opinion created a per se rule of legal-
ity with respect to the activities of a parent corporation and its wholly 
owned subsidiary, without any discussion of either the anticompetitive 
conduct of the parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary in 
Copperweld, or the effect that such conduct has on a competitor. 56 
The dissent stated that the majority was too quick to discount the 
Yellow Cab line of cases in finding that antitrust liability could have been 
based on grounds other than the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 57 
The dissent contended there was no evidence in Yellow Cab and its prog-
eny to show that liability rested on anything other than the intra-enter-
prise conspiracy doctrine.58 Moreover, the dissent asserted that because 
the affiliated enterprises in Copperweld were separately incorporated, 
they were capable of conspiring. 59 The dissent further stated that be-
cause the original trust60 was one of the combinations Congress intended 
to police, the majority's immunization of a parent corporation and its 
wholly owned subsidiary from section 1 liability frees from antitrust 
scrutiny the type of organization most resembling the trusts existing at 
the time of the Sherman Act's enactment.61 The dissent urged that any 
conduct that is anticompetitive and restrains third parties, such as the 
defendants' actions that caused the plaintiff's delayed entry into the steel 
tubing industry, should not escape Sherman Act liability simply because 
the conduct is that of a parent corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiary.62 
The majority opinion in Copperweld reflects the economic realities of 
corporate structures. Decentralized management and autonomy in day-
to-day decisionmaking increases corporate efficiency and thus enhances 
competition by allowing top management to focus on the major decisions 
and long-term goals of the corporate family while delegating short-term 
55. Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall. Justice White did not participate in the decision. /d. at 2745. 
56. Id. at 2755. 
57. See id. at 2746-48. For the other grounds of liability noted by the majority, see 
supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
58. Copperwe/d, 104 S. Ct. at 2746-48. 
59. See id. at 2750. The dissent stated that the corporation is a "separate legal entity; 
. . . [its] form cannot be disregarded." Id. 
60. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
61. Copperwe/d, 104 S. Ct. at 2751. The dissent stated that if, as the majority contends, 
section 1 of the Sherman Act applies only to acquisitions of corporate affiliates, 
then, "it would have meant that [in 1890] § 1 would have no application to trust 
combinations which had already been formed - the very trusts to which Senator 
Sherman was referring." Id. at 2751 n.18. 
The majority, however, rejected the dissent's analysis by pointing out that a 
trust or combination already in existence in 1890 falls within the purview of section 
1 when the "original anticompetitive purpose is evident from the affiliated corpora-
tions' subsequent conduct." /d. at 2737 (footnote omitted). 
62. See id. at 2753-55. 
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decisionmaking to lower level management. 63 Separate incorporation 
may effectuate such efficiency by utilizing a form of decentralized man-
agement. Furthermore, doing business through a separately incorpo-
rated subsidiary offers other advantages not within the scope of antitrust 
liability.64 Because the risk of failure can be passed on to the subsidiary, 
separate incorporation of the subsidiary allows the corporate family to 
enter new markets that it would not otherwise enter.65 
The anomaly in the dissent's analysis is that the analysis focuses 
initially on whether there has been an unreasonable restraint of trade. If 
such a restraint exists, the dissent would hold that the corporations' affili-
ation should not relieve them of section 1 liability.66 The dissent's order 
of analysis is backward. If the parent corporation and wholly owned 
subsidiary lack the capacity to conspire, the inquiry ends for purposes of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, and whether there may have been an un-
reasonable restraint of trade is irrelevant. By arguing in support of the 
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the dissent failed to acknowledge 
the economic reality that a parent corporation and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary constitute one entity, striving to benefit the subsidiary's sole 
shareholder, the parent. Although the dissent points out the explicit 
adoption of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in the Yellow Cab 
line of cases, the only justification that the dissent provides for treating 
incorporated subsidiaries differently from unincorporated divisions is 
that the entity may realize possible efficiencies in operating its subsidiary 
as a separate corporation.67 Taking advantage of economic efficiencies, 
however, is no reason to penalize incorporated subsidiaries when their 
conduct poses no greater anticompetitive threat to society than does a 
division's conduct. The dissent's argument, that entities such as the par-
ent corporation and wholly owned subsidiary in Copperweld are similar 
to the original trusts prohibited by the Sherman Act,68 also fails because 
the trusts referred to in the Sherman Act were formed for the illegal 
purpose of inhibiting competition.69 There was no evidence that Cop-
63. See A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 57, 309-11 (1962) (discussing the 
organizational structures adopted by E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., General Mo-
tors Corp., Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and Sears, Roebuck and Company). 
64. See Handler & Smart, supra note 22; at 62-63 n.193; see also Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2743. 
65. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation In Support 
of Petitioners [Copperweld] at 14, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 
104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984); see also Handler & Smart, supra note 22, at 62-63 n.193 (two 
reasons cited for doing business through a subsidiary are expansion of operations 
into a new country where the local law prohibits or makes difficult the operation of 
the parent in that country and the limitation of contract or tort liability). 
66. Copperwe/d, 104 S. Ct. at 2746. 
67. [d. at 2753-54 n.27. The dissent suggested that because the enterprise may realize 
some economic benefit from the separate incorporation of the subsidiary, to subject 
such entities to the sanctions of the Sherman Act, while immunizing unincorporated 
divisions, is appropriate. [d. 
68. [d. at 2751; see supra note II and accompanying text. 
69. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2737 n.4, 2744 n.23. The Court noted that it is the unlaw-
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perweld acquired Regal Tube intending to unreasonably restrain trade in 
the steel tubing industry. The dissent artificially created two entities in 
order to bridge the gap in the majority's interpretation of the Sherman 
Act. It was unnecessary to bridge the gap between section 1 and section 
2, however, because as the majority stated, other provisions of the anti-
trust laws provide adequate sanctions for anticompetitive conduct that 
the Sherman Act leaves untouched.70 
Because the Court explicitly restricted its holding to cases involving 
a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary,11 Copperweld did 
not answer whether two wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent 
corporation can conspire with each other. The reasoning of the majority, 
however, suggests that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a single parent 
corporation are likewise incapable of conspiring in violation of section 
1; 72 again, because both are striving to benefit their sole shareholder, the 
parent corporation. That the two subsidiaries may hold themselves out 
as competitors is irrelevant because they are both ultimately controlled 
by the parent; any agreement among them does not involve the prohib-
ited "sudden joining of economic interests which were previously 
independent. "73 
To resolve the question of the conspiratorial capacity of a parent 
corporation and its subsidiaries that are less than wholly owned, a stan-
dard is needed that can easily be applied and understood, that promotes 
the goals of the Sherman Act, and that acknowledges the efficiencies cre-
ated by today's enterprise structures.74 Measuring the percentage of the 
subsidiary's stock owned by the parent provides such a standard. The 
percentage of the subsidiary's stock owned by a parent corporation is 
usually indicative of the degree of control that the parent may exercise 
ful combination that is prohibited by the Sherman Act; not the "lawful and useful 
combination" (quoting Senator Sherman). Id. at 2744 n.23. 
70. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
71. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2740. 
72. See McDavid, The Court's Welcome Demise o/the "Bathtub" Conspiracy Doctrine, 
Nat'l L.J., July 23, 1984, at 24, cols. 1 & 2. Lower courts since Copperweld have 
held that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent corporation are inca-
pable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Greenwood 
Utilities Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1496 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1984); Century 
Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316, 1317 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Carol Hizel & Sons, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1201, 1202 (D. 
Colo. 1984). But see Ray Dobbins Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 604 F. 
Supp. 203, 205 (W.O. Va. 1984) (holding that Copperweld is not applicable to two 
wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent). 
73. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742. 
74. In formulating a new standard to determine when an enterprise contains the plural-
ity of actors required under section 1 of the Sherman Act, four necessary character-
istics of a test have been identified: sensitivity to antitrust goals; comprehension of 
modern business structures; resistance to easy manipulation by corporations; and 
simplicity. Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decisionmaking Ap-
proach, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1732, 1753 (1983). 
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over the subsidiary.75 If the parent corporation owns more than fifty 
percent of the subsidiary's stock and exercises its right to vote in accord-
ance with its ownership, the parent corporation has the ultimate control 
over major decisions affecting the subsidiary. The exercise of such voting 
rights may include the election of directors who, in turn, may elect the 
officers of the subsidiary corporation. Thus, the parent can control the 
subsidiary through the managerial staff it elects. In accordance with 
Copperweld's holding, a per se rule that a parent corporation that owns 
more than fifty percent of its subsidiary's stock is incapable of conspiring 
with its subsidiary would provide a well reasoned and easily applied 
test.76 . 
To determine the conspiratorial capacity of an affiliated corporation 
and its parent that owns less than fifty-one percent of the stock, a combi-
nation of the tests previously applied by the various circuits77 would pro-
vide an appropriate standard. The courts should consider several factors: 
whether the corporations have separate officers and directors or separate 
corporate headquarters;78 who makes the long-term decisions within the 
subsidiary; 79 and the history of the corporations,80 such as, whether the 
subsidiary in the past has taken actions adverse to the parent corpora-
tion. These factors would tend to show the autonomy, or lack thereof, of 
the affiliated corporations and determine whether the corporations make 
75. See McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises and Section I of the Sherman 
Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183, 212 (1955) (if parent holds greater than fifty percent of 
stock, control is through ownership, not agreement). 
76. If, however, the alleged Sherman Act violation involves a consolidation, merger, or 
a transfer of assets, a greater percentage of shareholder votes may be required to 
approve the activity in question. Thus, a fifty-one percent ownership of the stock 
itself would not allow the owner of that stock to control the decision. See, e.g., 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.105 (West 1949) (requiring the approval of two thirds of 
the votes entitled to be cast to ratify proposed merger); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE 
ANN. § 3-105(d) (1985) (proposed merger, consolidation, or transfer of assets re-
quires approval by two thirds of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.24.020(3) (1969 & Supp. 1985) (requiring two thirds ap-
proval by shareholders entitled to vote on a proposed transfer of assets). But see 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 2S1(c) and § 271(a) (1983) (requiring only a majority 
approval of such matters). 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. 
78. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting 
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 328 (1977)), cert. denied, 
445 U.S. 917 (1980). 
79. Identifying who makes the long-term decisions would indicate who retains ultimate 
control over the affiliated corporation. See Comment, supra note 74 at 1738 n.35, 
1754 (advocating decision making approach for all entities regardless of their corpo-
rate status). The short-term decisionmaking should not be a factor in determining 
conspiratorial capacity because the decentralization of a corporate enterprise result-
ing in the delegation of "day-to-day authority" is in harmony with antitrust goals. 
See id. at 1739. 
80. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726 (7th Cir. 1979), (quoting 
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 328 (1977)), cert. denied, 
445 U.S. 917 (1980). 
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up the plurality of actors required by section 1 of the Sherman Act. 8 ! 
Another factor that indicates the degree of the parent corporation's con-
trol over the subsidiary is the number of proxies assigned to the parent 
corporation by the remainder of the shareholders. For example, if indi-
vidual shareholders own a majority of the affiliate's stock, and the parent 
corporation owns only twenty percent of the affiliated corporation, the 
parent corporation may control the major decisionmaking of the affiliate 
through voting the proxies of the other shareholders. 82 
The Court's holding in Copperweld reflects the economic realities of 
the modern business world. Although the Copperweld opinion is limited 
to parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries, the rationale 
underlying Copperweld may similarly be applied to two wholly owned 
subsidiaries of a common parent corporation or to a subsidiary whose 
parent corporation owns more than fifty percent of the subsidiary's stock. 
Copperweld's focus on the degree of ultimate control exercised by the 
parent corporation over the subsidiary provides guidance for determining 
conspiratorial capability of a subsidiary and parent corporation owning 
less than fifty-one percent of the subsidiary's stock. Moreover, the Cop-
perweld decision provides lower courts with a uniform standard to apply 
in the case of a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary. 
Linda T. Penn 
81. The "detrimental effect on third parties" test, mentioned previously in the text, has 
been omitted as a relevant factor in determining the conspiratorial capacity of a 
corporation and its parent that owns less than fifty-one percent of the stock. This 
test is rejected because it focuses on the impact of the corporations' conduct rather 
than on the separateness of the corporations. See Handler & Smart, supra note 21, 
at 51. The "holding out as competitors" test is also omitted because there may be 
no deception involved when the people who deal with the corporations are aware 
that the corporations are affiliated. See id. at 55. 
82. Cf McQuade, supra note 33, at 212-13 (majority may acquiesce in minority's exer-
cise of control if they reap benefits therefrom). 
